Paratroopers - Ready for Anything – From WWII to Afghanistan

Though not so well known as the land and air campaigns, the campaign at sea in the 1991 Gulf War was vital in subduing Saddam Hussein's invasion forces and driving them out of Kuwait. U.S. Navy surface ships and submarines launched hundreds of cruise missile attacks against Iraqi targets throughout the war, and carriers sent air strikes deep into enemy territory. The battleships Missouri and Wisconsin bombarded hostile targets while U.S. sailors joined U.S. Army and Royal Navy helicopter crews in additional actions. SEAL missions, global sealift actions, mine countermeasures, and operations in support of the economic embargo were still more contributing factors to the complex joint warfare effort.

Details of these naval operations are thoroughly documented and analyzed in this authoritative study, conducted by the Naval Historical Center and published in limited numbers in 1999. It is based on previously classified action and lessons-learned reports, interviews with participants, and studies conducted by the Center for Naval Analyses and the Department of Defense. The book includes candid evaluations of leadership effectiveness, interservice relations, and methods of command and control. It also analyses the effectiveness of various weapons and sensors, including the Tomahawk land-attack missile, the EA-6B Prowler electronic warfare aircraft, the Aegis battle management system, and unmanned aerial vehicles. Winner of the Navy League's Theodore and Franklin D. Roosevelt Naval History Prize and favorably reviewed by military scholars and foreign affairs journals, this credible historical account captures the drama as well as the detail of a modern victory at sea.

Chronicles in compelling detail the historic showdown between the U.S. Air Force and the Navy over the role of carrier aviation in the national security framework of the United States.

The National Security Act of 1947, intended to unify the separate armed services under a single Defense Secretary, failed to settle the deeper issue that divided them, the debate over roles and missions. One symptom of this conflict was a showdown between the Air Force and the Navy over the role of carrier aviation in the national security framework of the United States.

From the early days of aviation, Army and Navy aviators had approached their roles very differently. Army air doctrine centered on strategic bombing, while Navy doctrine focused on carrier air power as an increasingly important element of the fleet’s offensive striking power. In the postwar era of demobilization, these differences were exacerbated as each service fought for its share of a decreasing defense budget. Louis A. Johnson’s appointment as Secretary of Defense in late March 1949 added to the Air Force-Navy friction. While Johnson allowed procurement of B-36s for the Air Force’s strategic bombing program to be greatly accelerated, he cancelled development of the first flush-deck supercarrier, which would have enabled the Navy to operate long-range attack aircraft capable of carrying atomic weapons. This rejection fueled the Navy’s fear that naval aviation was to have a diminishing role in the new atomic age and provided the final impetus for a clash between the Air Force and the Navy.

The conflict came to a head when an anonymous document was delivered to members of Congress in May 1949, alleging improprieties in the Air Force procurement of the B—36 bomber. Although later found to be baseless, these charges inspired two sets of congressional hearings: the first on the B-36 bomber program itself, and the second on the issue of unification and strategy. During the latter hearings, high-ranking naval officers voiced their opinions that naval aviation was being denigrated by a Defense Secretary enamored with the possibilities of strategic bombing and scornful of the Navy’s contribution to such a mission. The press soon termed their vehement testimony in support of naval aviation the “revolt of the admirals.”

The Eastern Front 1943. A massive Russian offensive has fragmented the German frontlines forcing them into a fighting retreat back towards the Oder River to establish defensive bridgeheads in an attempt to slow the Soviet masses. However elements of the 1st SS LAH Panzer division have managed to hold their positions within these lines and have withstood the brunt of the Soviet onslaught.

Due to sketchy communications they are unaware that a major retreat has taken place as they continue to press forward into the increasing Red Army hoards, often forced into bloody hand to hand combat. Will word reach these men that they are in fact alone and pushing on in the wrong direction? Or will they realise their situation only to be engaged in a deadly race backwards through enemy held territory strewn with death and destruction to reach the Oder River and relative safety before the Russians reach its banks?

Great Escapes of World War II
Tom Dick and Harry to Stalag to Colditz

Contents
Introduction; The Laufen Six; Slawomir Rawicz: Hero or Hoaxer?; Airey Neave and Norman Forbes Escape from Thorn; Dulag Luft Tunnel; The Colditz Canteen Tunnel; The Theatre Bust: Airey Neave and Anthony Luteyn; The Medium-Sized Officer; Pat Reid Escapes from Colditz; The Wooden Horse; The Great Escape

More than 170,000 British prisoners of war were taken by German and Italian forces during World War II, enough men to populate modern-day St Lucia. Most were captured in a string of defeats in France, North Africa and the Balkans between 1940 and 1942. They were held in a network of POW camps stretching from Nazi-occupied Poland to Italy. On the whole, the Germans and Italians treated their British prisoners properly, but the rules of the Geneva Convention, set up to govern how POWs should be treated under law, was not always followed and some camps were more hospitable than others. By far the most harmful aspects of incarceration were physical debilitation caused by chronic food shortages, and boredom. Food scarcity was a problem across the board but, to some extent, this could be addressed by the Red Cross, who regularly sent food parcels to men in prison camps. Boredom, however, was a killer. Many prisoners had suddenly gone from being busily engaged in high-adrenalin combat situations to a prison camp, where their identity was stripped away and every aspect of their lives taken out of their control. A small proportion were driven mad. Others became hell-bent on escape.
Hollywood Myth : Hollywood has led us to believe that all our POWs were impassioned escapers. That is utterly untrue. The vast majority of prisoners were too physically weak, through meagre food rations and gruelling hard work, even to contemplate escape. They had already given everything they had to the war effort, and enough was enough. They figured that, if they could sit out the rest of the war in prison, keep their noses clean and their heads down, they may be lucky enough to see their families again.  Escape, on the other hand, was a highly dangerous undertaking. Very few successfully made it out of the camp and those who did ran a very real risk of being shot on sight. Often it involved months of hard work followed by long, gruelling journeys through enemy territory with very little or no food.  Many who eventually reached a neutral border were so exhausted by the time they got there that they lost concentration and wandered straight back into enemy hands.

Author Biography
Freya Hardy is a freelance writer. She regularly contributes to a number of national and international magazines. She worked as an editor for several publishers for eight years before deciding to view the publishing world from an author’s point of view instead. Fascinated by history she has a particular interest in 20th century history and World War II. She lives with her husband and twin daughters in East Sussex.